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crew via the cockpit display system. 
This discretization process requires abstracting information 
away in order to present only meaningful information (in 
terms of operations) to the flying crew. Indeed, aircraft 
systems behavior may be very complex (e.g. an engine) and 
abstracting away information that is not relevant for 
operations is a challenge. Such concerns have been clearly 
stated in [2], where MCDU (Multi-function Control and 
Display Unit) has been identified as issues for pilot when 
transitioning to glass cockpits. Abstraction can be 
performed by removing information (e.g. not presenting 
vibration level of an engine to the crew) or grouping 
information on equivalence classes of values for a given 
parameter (e.g. presenting thresholds such as battery 
voltage is above or below 20%). Such abstraction 
mechanisms are heavily dependent on the type of the 
parameters and on the context of use of these parameters 
and thus no generic rule can be applied. Besides, when all 
the relevant information is presented, it is still difficult for 
the flying crew to identify the current state of the system 
and to answer questions such as “According to the values 
displayed can I still perform my mission (i.e. follow the 
flight plan)?”. 
Another problem is that the aircraft systems are connected 
to each other and that a given device (e.g. an engine) can 
provide multiple services to the aircraft (e.g. bleed, 
electricity or thrust) that are relevant to the crew. 
Understanding (and representing) this chain of connected 
systems is of prime importance when designing HMIs for 
pilots. Indeed, connecting operations (i.e. mission) and the 
underlying aircraft systems is the only way to reduce 
workload as identified in [2]. For instance, bleed can be 
provided by the engines and/or the APU (Auxiliary Power 
Unit). Bleed status thus depends on the current functioning 
of these two aircraft systems. The number of instances also 
depends on the aircraft types (e.g. 2 or 4 engines).  
In this paper, we propose a twin approach to tackle these 
problems:  
· A generic system architecture describing the
complexity of aircraft systems and the relationship
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INTRODUCTION 
Aircraft cockpits are complex systems (in terms of design, 
development and use) providing flying crew with means for 
interacting with multiple aircraft systems. Cockpits 
integrate in one single location the information about these 
systems as well as the commands to exploit them. The 
Engine Indication and Alerting System for Flight Crew is 
the system that integrates parameters of aircraft systems 
such as engines, hydraulic or fuel [1]. While aircraft 
systems are mainly analogous in terms of information they 
produce (e.g. temperature, rotation speed, etc.), this 
information is discretized when presented to the flying 
between those systems. This generic architecture is 
made up of four types of components: System Devices, 
System services, Compound services and User services 
(and is called DSCU); 
· A classification of states for each of the elements of
the DSCU architecture. This classification is made up
of two state descriptors (Operational and Qualitative)
and of two attributes for the state descriptors
(Restrictions and Context). This classification is called
OQCR.
The paper is structured as follows. Next section presents 
the global organization of modern aircraft cockpits 
focusing on the Engine Indication and Alerting System for 
Flight Crew. It presents such systems for both A350 
(ECAM) and B777 (EICAS) highlighting commonalities 
and differences. We then present the generic architecture 
(DSCU) in section 3 and the state classification (OQCR) in 
section 4. Section 5 (entitled “Case Study: OQCR and 
DSCU Applied to AIR COND System”) presents the 
application of both contributions on the AIR COND 
systems and demonstrates how the results can be used to 
design abstract Human Machine Interfaces. Last section 
highlights lessons learned, concludes the paper and identify 
future directions for this work. 
ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF SYSTEMS’ 
INFORMATION IN AIRCRAFT COCKPITS 
Aircraft equipped with glass cockpit present information to 
the flying crew using multiple Display Units (DU). The 
Main Instrument Panel of both A350 (Figure 1) and B777 
contain six Display Units organized in a similar way. The 
DUs present information either permanently (e.g. altitude, 
airspeed, etc.), dynamically (e.g. recommended recovery 
action after a failure) or on demand (e.g. flight plan).  
Figure 1. Display Units layout on the Airbus A350 Main 
Instrument Panel. 
The Engine Indication and Alerting System for Flight Crew 
is responsible for displaying: 
· Information related to the aircraft systems (engines,
bleed air system, etc.) using system-oriented pages;
· Alerts;
· Recommended recovery actions corresponding to these
alerts (displayed respectively on the Warning Display
of the A350 and the Electronic Check List of the
B777);
· Memo and advisory messages associated to the current
aircraft status.
This section presents how these three kinds of information 
are presented on both the B777 and the A350 and details 
what can be learnt from existing HMIs to propose a generic 
state-based description of the aircraft systems status. 
Synoptic Pages/System Display Pages 
The Synoptic Pages (EICAS) or System Display Pages 
(ECAM) are pages designed to provide, on demand, an 
overview of the status of an aircraft device or system. The 
B777 proposes seven Synoptic pages while the A350 
proposes 13 SD pages. On both aircraft, we can distinguish 
i) pages/sections focusing on a specific device (e.g.
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)) and ii) system-specific pages
that depicts how a set of devices produces or uses a given
system (e.g. the Bleed Air System (BAS)).
Device-specific Pages 
On the A350 and the B777, the Auxiliary Power Unit is a 
fuel-powered turbine capable of producing bleed air and 
electricity. On the A350, the monitoring of the APU is 
possible through the “APU” SD Page (Figure 2). This page 
presents, during normal operations: 
· Gauges presenting the speed of the APU Turbine (N,
in %) and the temperature of its exhausts gas (EGT, in
°C);
· A text label for the quantity of fuel used by the APU
since last reset (APU FU, in KG);
· A text label indicating if the APU is AVAILable
(whenever N>70%);
· An APU GEN box with a triangle on top (left-hand
side);
· A BLEED box with a representation of valve on top
(right-hand side).
Figure 2. The A350 APU SD Page 
On the B777, there is no full Synoptic page dedicated to the 
APU. However, the STATUS page contains an “APU” box 
(Figure 3) that presents, during normal operation, labels for 
the turbine rotation (in percent Rotation Per Minute) and 
turbine EGT as well as the APU oil in terms of pressure, 
temperature and quantity. 
Figure 3. The B777 APU information on the STATUS page 
One can observe that Figure 2 presents (in addition to 
operational parameters related to the APU turbine), 
information about bleed air (BLEED box, top-left of Figure 
2) and electricity produced by APU (GEN box, top-right of
Figure 2). No information regarding what the APU 
produces is given on the “APU” box of the B777 STATUS 
page (Figure 3). Such differences makes the impact of 
turning on/off or losing the APU not directly perceivable 
on the B777 APU box. 
Whenever the APU is running as expected, the “AVAIL” 
message is displayed at the top of the “APU” SD page. No 
such message is present on the “APU” box on the STATUS 
page of the B777, meaning that establishing if the APU is 
running properly requires a reading of the RPM value. Note 
however that both the A350 and the B777 display, at 
various locations of the cockpit, a permanent reminder 
(“APU AVAIL” or “APU RUNNING”, respectively) 
whenever the APU is operating.  
During abnormal operations, no additional information is 
provided on B777 APU box on STATUS page. The 
diagnosis of a low level of oil for instance requires the 
reading of the associated numerical value. On the other 
hand, the A350 APU SD page provides various messages 
and visual indications to highlight failures. Example of 
such messages and indications are presented in Table 1. 
Here, while no numerical values related to the APU oil is 
displayed, the flight crew is still informed of a low level of 
oil (Line #1 in Table 1). The level of severity of the 
messages is presented via color-coding. For instance, on 
line #2, the APU N overspeed in red is associated to a 
malfunction that will cause an emergency shutdown of the 
APU after a confirmation time. The amber associated to 
value on line #3 and #4 indicates non-critical malfunction 
that have no immediate impact on the APU while the green 
message “OIL LEVEL LO” of line #1 acts as a reminder.  
Table 1. Example of variation of visualization during 
abnormal operations on the APU SD Page. 
# Visualisation Description of fault/failure 
1 The APU oil level is low. 
2 
APU N rotation speed is equal to, or more 
than, the APU N red limit. 
3 The APU generator voltage is abnormal. 
4 The APU BLEED valve is abnormally closed. 
From the description of these two cockpits we can see that 
while the devices are similar (APUs) the type of 
information, the level of detail of that information and the 
way this information are presented differ. The differences 
lay in the level of abstraction of this information. Some 
information is abstracted away until not presented anymore 
(e.g. Oil in the A350) or on the contrary, more detailed 
(both a graphical and numeric information about APU 
speed in A350 and only numeric value on B777). This 
demonstrates the fact that abstraction is managed 
differently by designers of those systems and that the actual 
state of the aircraft device requires specific pilot knowledge 
e.g. the RPM nominal value (100%) is 48 800. Beyond,
abnormal situation are presented through color-coding
adding to the value itself that information about the 
operational status of the device. 
System-specific Pages 
After the APU specific information page, we present how a 
similar abstraction mechanism is applied on a broader 
system (the air bleed), receiving input from multiple 
devices including the APU presented above.  
Figure 4 presents the A350 “BLEED” SD page and Figure 
5 presents the B777 “AIR” Synoptic page, both during 
normal operation. We observe that their structure is similar. 
Indeed, the “AIR” Synoptic (Figure 5) presents the 
information of the B777 Bleed Air System (BAS). The 
upper part (depicting an aircraft fuselage) integrates the 
information related to air conditioning. The air-
conditioning information is presented on a specific SD page 
called “AIR COND” in the A350 (that we do not present 
due to space constraint). Thus, the layout of the B777 
“AIR” Synoptic page makes explicit the relationship 
between the BAS and the air-conditioning while the A350 
“BLEED” SD page does not. 
Figure 4. The A350 BLEED SD page. 
While information such as bleed air pressure are presented 
on both aircraft (30 PSI on the A350 (Figure 4) and DUCT 
PRESS 40 on the B777 (Figure 5)), we observe that other 
information such as the bleed air temperature in only 
presented on A350 (150°C on Figure 4). This shows that 
some information has been abstracted away on the B777 
during normal operation.  
Figure 5. The B777 AIR synoptic page present both BLEED 
and AIR COND information  
Regarding abnormal operations, both aircraft propose 
variation of visualizations (based on shapes and color 
coding) on the “AIR”/”BLEED pages (see Table 2).  
Table 2. Example of variation of visualization during 
abnormal operations on the BLEED page/AIR synoptic. 
A350 BLEED B777 AIR Description of fault/failure 
The bleed air pressure is abnormal 
The valve is abnormally closed. 
Beyond this information presentation aspect about the 
bleed system, it is important to note that bleed air is 
produced by three devices including the APU and both 
engines. This structure of service production is graphically 
represented in the pages (bottom of Figure 4 and Figure 5) 
showing additionally the fact the there is an additional 
service called bleed routing. This bleed routing system 
(composed of pipes/ducts, valves) is also graphically 
represent using symbols (see last line of Table 2) and the 
fact that it connects bleed to the devices is made explicit 
through this representation. 
Alerting System/Warning System 
The Alerting System (EICAS) and the Warning System 
(ECAM) are responsible for the presentation of (i) 
Abnormal and emergency procedures and (ii) Limitations 
and Memos. In both systems, the procedures are associated 
to alerts (EICAS and ECAM Alert column in Table 3) 
triggered by conditions such as those presented in the first 
column of Table 3. In these APU-related examples, the 
APU continues to either operate abnormally (APU 
LIMIT/FAULT) or automatically stops (APU (AUTO) 
SHUTDOWN). An important highlight here is that multiple 
failure lead to the same alert abstracting away information 
(especially the causes of the alert). 
Table 3. Examples of EICAS and ECAM Alert for APU faults. 
APU Failure EICAS Alert ECAM Alert 
High EGT; 
High oil temperature; 
Low oil pressure; … 
Turbine overspeed; … 
Abnormal and emergency procedures are the recommended 
recovery actions provided by the Engine Indication and 
Alerting System for Flight Crew following the occurrence 
of a fault/failure.  
After completing a procedure, some systems may become 
non-available either because of their own state (e.g. the 
APU after a fire) or because of the execution of a procedure 
(e.g. closing some of the BAS valves after a bleed leak). 
Both EICAS and ECAM provide a mechanism to remind 
the flying crew about those inoperative systems as 
presented in Figure 6 (inoperative systems after a bleed 
leak on the A350). First line tells that engine 1 will not 
provide bleed anymore as well as the APU (second line).  
Figure 6. Inoperative Systems on the A350 after a bleed leak 
In addition to impacting aircraft systems and services (e.g. 
bleed), the execution of some procedures may also limit the 
aircraft operational capabilities. Figure 7 presents an 
example of limitation for the A350 stating that pilots must 
do not use the manual mode of the cabin pressurization 
because it is totally lost. 
Figure 7. Example of LIMITATIONS on the ECAM WD 
Analysis of Existing Presentation Organization and 
System Presentation in Cockpit 
In this section, we presented some of the displays of 
existing Engine Indication and Alerting Systems for Flight 
Crew used in different aircraft. The information structuring 
and information abstraction we highlighted drove us to the 
observations presented below. 
Obs. 1: During normal operations, parameters values may 
be replaced by abstract information indicating whether a 
device is on, off, starting, etc. 
With the example of the APU, we noted that whenever the 
APU is running (i.e. when its speed is >70%), the B777 and 
A350 respectively display “APU RUNNING” or “APU 
AVAIL”. Beyond, during normal operation it is not 
necessary to look at the operational parameters of the 
“APU” page/box to determine if the APU is running as 
expected, as this information is directly presented next to 
the parameters. 
Obs. 2: During abnormal operations, display of parameters 
value may be replaced by information indicating if the 
device/system is either in a degraded mode or stopped 
working. 
Table 3 shows that for a set of APU malfunctions related to 
abnormal values of operational parameters (e.g. oil and 
EGT), the same EICAS/ECAM alert is presented to the 
flight crew. When one of these alerts occurs, the APU may 
either stop functioning (APU (AUTO) SHUTDOWN) or 
continue to operate in an abnormal configuration (APU 
LIMIT/FAULT). Therefore, values of operational 
parameters may be replaced by an information indicating 
how severely the device is impacted by the variation of 
parameters as the actual value does not impact the state of 
the device. 
Obs. 3:  Aircraft systems are impacted by the variables of 
related systems that may prevent using them even though 
their operational parameters are “healthy”. 
In Figure 6, we note that following a leak in the BAS, some 
systems are reported inoperative even though they are not 
faulty. For instance, APU bleed is presenting as faulty even 
though the APU device is fully functional. This is presented 
as bleed system is not able to receive bleed from the APU 
(due to the bleed leak). We claim that flight crew may take 
advantage of a detailed description of the relationship 
between service providers (e.g. APU bleed) and service 
consumers (Bleed system). This connection is currently 
partly represented (see Figure 4 and Figure 5), but not in a 
global and systematic way.  
With these observations in mind, we propose: 
1) a generic architecture for aircraft systems to describe
devices, systems and services connectivity in a
systematic manner (Obs. 3) presented in next section,
2) a generic state description taking into Obs. 1, 2 and 3
in order to propose generic states for devices, systems
and services that would be the basis for abstract
information presented in the HMI of aircraft cockpits.
A GENERIC ARCHITECTURE FOR AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
Previous section shows that system pages may differ 
significantly one from another showing sometimes the 
information of a dedicated device (e.g. APU page of the 
A350) or blending information from multiple devices (e.g. 
engines and APU bleed and bleed routing together with 
their connections as on Figure 5). While some elements are 
physical devices (e.g. APU) other ones are more complex 
and multifaceted elements (e.g. bleed). From the physical 
devices to the services used by the pilots and passengers 
(e.g. air conditioning) there is a variety of different types of 
interconnected systems. Defining a generic architecture, we 
propose to make explicit both these categories and their 
relationships in order to decompose the complexity of 
aircraft systems.  
Detailed Presentation of the Components of the 
Architecture 
Figure 8 presents the proposed DSCU generic architecture 
which decomposes what is usually called aircraft systems 
into four different types of components: System Device, 
System Service, Compound Service and User Service. 
Their relationships are shown on Figure 8, which is 
presented in details from left to right in the following 
sections.  
Figure 8. Generic Architecture of aircraft systems 
System Device 
A System Device (the component on the left-hand side of 
Figure 8) is the primary device responsible of the 
production of services. The System Device may need other 
components for performing its functions and thus providing 
its services to other components of the architecture 
(represented by the arrows from the three types of service 
to System Device). System Devices have a state that may 
be presented to the users (pilots) on a user interfaces of 
command and monitor (dotted line at the top of Figure 8). 
A System Device can be a routing device (e.g. only 
composed of valves and pipes) enabling the delivery of a 
routing service.   
For example, the Figure 2 presents the APU and the 
BLEED routing (BLEED valve), which are System Devices 
according to DSCU architecture. The System Device APU 
produces two services: BLEED and GEN and needs fuel 
for its operation. 
System Service 
A System Service is a service enabled by the System 
Device. The production of a System Service relies on only 
one System Device. A System Service has a state that may 
be presented to the users. A System Service can be a 
routing service. A routing service may contributed to and 
produce other System Services. 
For example, the APU GEN and the APU BLEED (APU 
SD page in Figure 2), are System Service according to 
DSCU architecture. APU BLEED is transported by a 
BLEED routing System Service. Similarly APU GEN 
System Service needs a routing service (electrical network) 
to be transported, but this service is not explicitly 
represented on the APU SD page but the ELEC SD page 
represents it. 
Compound Service 
A Compound Service is a combination of several System 
Services. A Compound Service is responsible of the 
synthesis and integration of all the System Services 
enabling the delivery of a resource of interest from the 
system point of view (e.g. a service that is not directly used 
by the human user but that can be used by other systems). 
A Compound Service has a state based on the System 
Services states that produce it. This state may be presented 
to the users.  
For example, Figure 4 presents BLEED, which is a 
Compound Service according to DSCU architecture. The 
composition of APU BLEED, ENG 1 BLEED and ENG 2 
BLEED System Services produce (altogether) the BLEED 
Compound Service. 
User Service 
A User Service is a service of interest for the user. At least 
one Compound Service delivers a User Service. A routing 
System Service transports a User Service. The User Service 
has a state that can be computed from the state of each 
Compound Service that delivers it. This state may be 
presented to the user.  
For example, Figure 5 (top) presents AIR COND, which is 
a User Service according to DSCU architecture. The crew 
and passengers directly use AIR COND for their comfort. 
We use AIR COND User Service is in the illustrative 
example section of the paper.  
Each components of aircraft systems described using 
DSCU architecture has a state that may be presented to the 
pilots, this is why they are all connected to the user (via 
user interfaces) on the architecture. If we consider that 
pilots activities in the cockpit are structured around four 
main activities: 1) Fly 2) Communicate 3) Navigate and 4) 
Manage Systems, the supervision and management of the 
state of systems and services are part of Manage Systems 
activity of the pilots. Manage Systems activity requires, for 
each system, to understand how resources availability and 
consumption affect systems performances. The flying crew 
is primarily interested in the user services but may need to 
drill down to service, routing services and devices when 
faults occur and interfere with the normal delivery of the 
user service. Going back to the presentation of the 
information in the cockpit (previous section of the paper) 
this is where abstraction takes place. Devices and routing 
services are numerous and usually analog with continuous 
variables describing their state. This information has to be 
abstracted away to provide only meaningful and relevant 
information to the crew.  
Next section proposes a systematic grouping of states for 
devices and services described in a DSCU architecture. 
THE OQCR STATE DESCRIPTION 
Manage Systems activity requires (among other) consulting 
overhead panel and processing ECAM information and in 
particular the SD pages. In section 2, we highlighted that 
discrete information presented on SD pages describes the 
evolution of state of the device that we call here the 
operation state (e.g. ramping up, running). For example, 
the N speed indication or EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) 
indication for the APU presented in Figure 2 have to be 
perceived and interpreted by the pilot to understand that the 
APU is running, demonstrating the usefulness for an 
abstract information.  
Another key indication on SD pages is the state of the 
quality of operation. Most of the time, this state is 
represented using thresholds (exceeded or not) and thus 
going from continuous values to discrete one. For example, 
N OVERSPEED threshold of the APU presented in Figure 
2 corresponds to an abstraction of the current speed of the 
APU turbine. For abnormal conditions, a modifier (a color 
such as amber) is used to represent that additional 
information (as seen in Table 1). Similarly, amber 
indication on a system or service indicate its degraded state. 
During the training, the pilot learned performance issues of 
some systems in given particular contexts. For example, 
according to FCOM of A350 [5], the System Service APU 
BLEED is in its context of use up to an altitude of 25 000 
feet and out of context of use above. In case of some 
alarms, the pilot can read restrictions on the use of some 
systems. For example, according to the FCOM of the A350 
[5] such restrictions will be presented with the indication
“DO NOT USE” next to the name of the device or service.
Such restriction is presented in Figure 7.
In the following sections, we detail two generic categories 
for describing the states of systems and services. The first 
one is called Operation state (with four possible values) 
and the second called Qualitative state (with three possible 
values). These two categories cover the set of descriptions 
presented above. Beyond these two categories we propose 
the addition of Context attribute and of a Restriction 
attribute to represent more precisely the relationship 
between the states and the operations. These four elements, 
called OQCR, makes it possible to precisely represent 
systems and service states in an abstract way, i.e. without 
presenting the value of their internal parameters. While the 
categories apply to every component of DSCU, we propose 
different values (names of the states) according to type of 
component (see Table 4). 
Operational and Qualitative (OQ) States 
The Operation State of a system or a service describes in an 
abstract way its current behavior and is meant to provide 
immediate usable information to the crew. Table 4 presents 
the set of values of the Operation State for each 
components of the DSCU architecture. 
It should be noted that for some systems or services like 
ELEC Compound Service, “ramping up” and “ramping 
down” are transient states, meaning that the state change 
occurs very quickly and that it might not be relevant to 
present those transient state changes to the crew. Other 
components might need more time e.g. APU and thus 
presenting the information “starting” is relevant.  
Table 4. Operation State for the DSCU components 
Device System S. Compound S. User S. 
NOT RUNNING NOT PRODUCING NOT DELIVERING 
STARTING RAMPING UP 
RUNNING PRODUCING DELIVERING 
SHUTING DOWN RAMPING DOWN 
The Qualitative State of an element describes how well this 
element performs (if enabled) or will perform (if disabled). 
Table 5 presents the values of the Qualitative State for each 
components of the DSCU architecture. When the device (or 
service) is “degraded”, it means that a failure occurred on 
the device (or service) and an associated alarm is usually 
displayed. When the device is “out of order” (or a service 
“out of service”), it means that the device (or service) is no 
longer capable to run (or to deliver) for the rest of the 
mission. In current cockpits, a service “APU BLEED” is 
presented within the list of INOP SYS (Figure 6). 
Table 5. Values of the qualitative state 
Attribute Definition 
FUNCTIONAL 
The device can run properly. The service is 
produced or delivered as required. 
DEGRADED 
The device is not capable of running properly and 
suffers performance penalty. The service cannot be 
produced or delivered as required. 
OUT OF 
ORDER/SERVICE 
The device is not capable to run. The service 
cannot be produced or delivered for the entire 
mission. 
Context and Restriction (CR) Attributes 
The Context attribute indicates if the device or service 
evolves in a context that matches its specifications. The 
context is defined in aircraft systems by variables such as 
resources availability, flight envelope, flight phase, etc. 
Table 6 presents the values of the Context Attributes 
(applicable to all DSCU components). 
Table 6 Context attribute of state 
Context Attribute Definition 
WITHIN CONTEXT The device or service is in its nominal context of use.  
OUT OF CONTEXT The device or service is not in its nominal context of use.  
The usage Restriction attribute represents the impact of the 
current context of the aircraft on the availability of services 
or devices. Table 7 presents the possible values of the 
Restriction attribute (applicable to all DSCU components) 
for each components of the DSCU architecture. The “not 
allowed” value indicates that the component must not be in 
use in any case, even though it is “functional” and “within 
context”. For example, a “not allowed” system is 
represented with the “do not use” mention on the 
limitations display of A350 ECAM (see Figure 7). 
Table 7 Restriction attribute of state 
Restriction Attribute Definition 
ALLOWED The device or service can be use. 
NOT ALLOWED The device or service must not be in use. 
OQCR Summary 
Each type of components of DSCU architecture has a state 
made up of two states values and two attributes values as 
summarized in Table 8. With the OCQR approach, we can 
describe any state of a device or a service with one value 
out of twelve (for the state part), which as then to be 
completed by contextual information about the current 
operation of the aircraft (two additional values). In current 
cockpits, this information is sometimes already presented 
(e.g. APU avail in Figure 2) but might also be combined 
with continuous values e.g. temperature) or an abstraction 
of a value (percentage of the speed of the APU turbine). 
We believe this generic identification of states provides 
designers and flying crew with a mean for systematically 
considering internal systems or service states.  
Table 8. Structure of an OQCR state/attributes description 
O Q C R 
Operational 
state 
Qualitative state Context attribute Restriction 
attribute 
1 value out of 4 1 value out of 3 1 value out of 2 1 value out of 2 
It is important to note that, during operation, it might not be 
possible for the sensors to capture information about a 
device or system. In that case, the value of each of the four 
attributes of OQCR might be unknown (in addition to all 
the other values presented). 
CASE STUDY: OQCR AND DSCU APPLIED TO AIR 
CONDITIONING SYSTEM 
This section presents the application of both DSCU and 
OQCR to a large aircraft system. This case study aims at 
demonstrating the applicability of the proposed 
contribution to real case examples. It also demonstrates its 
scalability beyond the small examples used as illustration. 
Finally, it proposes some prototypes of HMIs to present 
such information to the flying crew.  
The Airbus A350-900 is equipped with an air conditioning 
system (called AIR COND) supplied by the Bleed Air 
System (BAS) that is electrically powered. In flight, the 
BAS supplies two air conditioning PACKs with air from 
the engines and/or the APU. The packs are the unit 
responsible of cooling the hot bleed air from the turbines. 
In early design stage of the A350, the APU performances 
were assumed to be insufficient to provide sufficient 
airflow for dual packs operations above 22 500ft. In such 
case, the ECAM would have presented the AIR APU 
BLEED LIMITED TO SINGLE PACK OPER alarm and 
its associated procedure. Not following this procedure 
would have resulted in the failure of a PACK and the 
presentation of associated alert. While the final version of 
the aircraft is not prone to such behavior thanks to the final 
APU characteristic, the work presented in this case study is 
based on this early design stage scenario that remains easy 
enough to discuss within the space constraint for this paper. 
Below we applied the DSCU architecture on the Air Cond 
service. Then, we illustrate the OCQR states of the 
different systems and services involved. 
DSCU Architecture for the AIR COND System 
Figure 9 presents the DSCU architecture applied to AIR 
COND system and its resources. AIR COND is defined as 
a User Service because passengers and crew are final users 
of this service which affects their comfort. AIR COND is 
provided using AIR COND Routing System Service 
enabled by the AIR COND Routing System Device (top 
right of Figure 9). Air conditioning is produced using 
PACK AIR service composed of 2 System services (called 
PACK 1 AIR and PACK 2 AIR) delivered by the devices 
PACK 1 and PACK 2. These two System Devices need 
BLEED Compound Service. The PACKS AIR Compound 
Figure 9. DSCU architecture showing devices (blue) and services (green) enabling the user service AIR COND (purple). 
Figure 10. Prototype presenting information integrating both DSCU and OQCR in the scenario 
Service transforms the PACK 1 AIR and PACK 2 AIR 
System Services into a usable AIR COND. From the left-
hand side of Figure 9 it is visible that ENGines and APU 
System Devices produce the BLEED Compound Service 
feeding PACK 1 and PACK 2 system devices. 
Figure 9, presents on a single diagram a complex set of 
devices and services together with their connections that 
contribute to the production of the user service AIR COND. 
We believe that the DSCU decomposition and structuring 
provide a systematic and efficient way to represent 
complex aircraft systems. 
HMI Prototypes for AIR COND 
This section presents some examples of HMI (Human-
Machine Interfaces) for presenting information about 
aircraft system to the flying crew. We only present those 
prototypes related to the AIR COND system, exploiting 
both the DSCU architecture of AIR COND presented in 
Figure 9 and the OQCR state decomposition. To make 
things more concrete, we propose the HMI in a context of a 
scenario, in which ENG 1 BLEED and ENG 2 BLEED are 
NOT PRODUCING  
(1) Initially, the aircraft flies at FL200 and all aircraft
devices and services are working properly. Especially, the
AIR COND is DELIVERING-FUNCTIONNAL-WITHIN
CONTEXT-ALLOWED. Following an ATC instruction to
climb, pilot flying changes the autopilot ALT settings to
climb to FL250. As the aircraft crosses the FL225, the AIR
COND context attribute changes. The “AIR APU BLEED
LIMITED TO SINGLE PACK OPER” alarm is displayed.
Following OQCR structure, AIR COND user service is
now DELIVERING-FUNCTIONNAL-OUT OF
CONTEXT-ALLOWED. Figure 11 presents a mockup of a 
visualization such an AIR COND state. 
Figure 11. Mockup for AIR COND (scenario 1) 
(2) In that scenario, pilots fail to react fast enough, the
BLEED AIR supply becomes insufficient to feed the air
conditioning packs triggering the display of “AIR PACK 1
FAULT”. Applying OQCR, AIR COND service is now
DELIVERING-DEGRADED-OUT OF CONTEXT-
ALLOWED. A mockup of presentation of this state is
shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12. Mockup for AIR COND (scenario 2) 
Figure 10 proposes an example of prototype that presents 
the states of all systems and services at the end of the 
scenario. The structure of the prototype follows DSCU 
architecture and information about each device and each 
service contributing to AIR COND is displayed. More 
precisely, because of “AIR PACK 1 FAULT” alarm the 
PACK 1 is now INOPerative (top-right corner of Figure 
10). In consequence, the PACK 1 Qualitative state is OUT 
OF ORDER. Its state Context attribute is OUT OF 
CONTEXT because of the lack of APU BLEED resource. 
Indeed, previously in the scenario, the aircraft crosses 
FL225 and the APU BLEED get out of its specification of 
usage. As a consequence, the “AIR APU BLEED 
LIMITED TO SINGLE PACK OPER” alarm is triggered. 
Following OQCR, APU BLEED Qualitative state is now 
DEGRADED (see third line of system service box on the 
right-hand side of Figure 10). 
Although the prototype must be revised with a User 
Centered Design process conducted with pilots, it is 
interesting to note that the prototype of Figure 10 is very 
different from the current user interfaces in large civil 
aircraft. There are multiple ways to move forward from it:  
1) use the prototype as a complementary display offering
abstract information about services and systems.
Flying crew would keep using Engine Indication and
Alerting System for Flight Crew pages to get more
precise information about systems and services
2) use the prototype as complementary interactive
prototype so that users can interact directly with it to
get more information but also to trigger commands on
systems and services
3) use the prototype as full interactive Engine Indication
and Alerting System for Flight Crew so that users can
interact with it to get more information but also to
trigger commands on systems and services. It would be
the main device for the activity manage systems.
Engine Indication and Alerting System for Flight Crew
could become a complementary device to it.
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
The work presented here fits well within the Cyber-
Physical Systems [11] (CPS) domain with a deep 
grounding in large civil aircraft systems.  
This paper has presented a double contribution. First, a 
cyber-physical systems architecture dedicated to aircraft 
systems. Second, a generic decomposition of the states of 
the components of the DSCU architecture taking into 
account both normal and abnormal situations. We have 
presented a set mockups and a prototype for presenting 
such state information to the flying crew. The prototype 
provides an abstract, generic and systematic representation 
supporting the task “Manage Systems” of large civil 
aircraft. It could thus be complementary to the current 
EICAS and ECAM systems that were introduced in the 
beginning of the paper. We demonstrated the use of the 
contribution to the AIR COND system. After these steps, 
usability testing and training costs analysis need to be 
performed.  
We believe the proposed approach is applicable to other 
cyber-physical systems such as medical devices or large 
command and control rooms such as nuclear power plants. 
The DSCU architecture would remain unchanged but the 
values of OQCR would require tuning according to the 
terminology used in that domain. The paper addresses 
known challenges in the CPS domain such as state 
descriptions [9], architecture [10] and command and 
control interface aspects [12]. 
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